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Abstract 
This forum debate discusses the link between Union citizenship and free movement. These concepts 
were long understood as progressive and fundamental mechanisms in drawing the citizen closer to the 
European integration project. Both concepts now appear in crisis. This is, of course, reflected in the 
run-up to, and outcome of the Brexit vote. But criticism on the link between Union citizenship and 
free movement must be understood in a wider context. It is the context within which welfare systems 
are perceived to struggle with the incorporation of migrant citizens; and within which the benefits 
linked to free movement are perceived to fall to specific groups or classes of citizens in society. This 
EUDO forum debate takes on this discussion in two different ways. One the one hand, it discusses 
whether free movement contributes to, or detracts from, the capacity of the EU to create a more just or 
legitimate relationship between its citizens. On the other hand, it discusses whether Union citizenship 
– a status that is fundamental to all nationals of the Member States, whether they move across borders 
or not – should be centred on free movement, or whether we need to rethink the premise of what it 
means to be a European citizen. 
Kickoff contribution and rejoinder by Floris de Witte, Daniel Thym, Richard Bellamy, Päivi Johanna 
Neuvonen, Vesco Paskalev, Saara Koikkalainen, Rainer Bauböck, Sarah Fine, Martijn van den Brink, 
Julija Sardelić, Kieran Oberman, Glyn Morgan, Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler, and Martin Ruhs. 
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Kick off contribution 
Freedom of movement under attack: 
Is it worth defending as the core of EU citizenship? 
Floris de Witte 
Freedom of movement is under attack from different sides. It is under attack politically in different 
Member States due to its alleged effect on the sustainability of the welfare state; it is under attack 
legally by the CJEU’s retrenchment of the rights of the poorest of Europe’s citizens; and it is under 
attack conceptually by those scholars and politicians who wish to understand EU citizenship to be 
primarily about the connection between all Member State nationals and the EU rather than focusing on 
the rights of mobile citizens alone. In all these accounts, the main fault line that seems to be emerging 
is that between mobile and immobile citizens in the EU – a fault line that the EU struggles to 
internalise politically and that can be traced back directly to the right to free movement.  
Is there any reason to defend free movement as the core of EU citizenship? I think that there is 
more than one. Below, I will argue that EU citizenship should be primarily about free movement as a) 
it emancipates the individual from the nation state; b) it serves to recalibrate questions of justice and 
democracy in a more appropriate manner; and c) it lacks the ties to a homogenous political 
‘community of fate’ that perpetuate significant exclusionary practices. For these reasons, free 
movement is the central thing that EU citizenship should be about: it is what makes EU citizenship 
distinctive from, and genuinely supplementary to, national citizenship.  
Free movement as emancipation 
Free movement is often understood in terms of its economic costs and benefits to the Member States 
of the EU. But we see something very different when we change the lens through which we look at 
free movement from one that is preoccupied with its effect on states to one that looks at its effect on 
the individual. From the latter perspective, freedom of movement is primarily about exactly that: the 
freedom to move out of one’s own state and to choose a different type of life in a different type of 
place. Thus understood, free movement is an emancipatory force. It allows individuals to live their 
lives unencumbered by the limits that their place of birth imposes on them, and freedom of movement 
allows them to understand themselves (and the possible realisations of that self) in much more 
authentic terms.  
This freedom of movement allows an LGBT+ couple that lives in a country in which the legal, 
political, cultural or social conditions do not allow for meaningful recognition of their love to move to 
a more permissive environment. It allows a retired teacher from Middlesbrough to enjoy her pension 
in sunny Lanzarote, and it allows a Romanian IT-consultant to move to Lille to live with his 
Hungarian girlfriend who works as a nurse in Belgium. Freedom of movement allows Europe’s 
citizens to move for love, work, family, language, social or cultural reasons, or simply to be 
somewhere ‘else’. It is about liberating the individual from the possibilities, opportunities, prejudices, 
cultural and social norms or convention (or even weather) that exists in their ‘own’ country, and about 
making available realisations of life in other states that might much more closely fit with the 
individual’s own preferences. To turn this around, it also means limiting the capacity of states to force 
the individual to live her life in a particular fashion. 
This emancipatory potential of free movement is not only realized through actual movement. It also 
has a reflexive virtue: it orients the individual’s visions of self-realisation and self-understanding 
                                                     

 London School of Economics and Political Science. 
Floris de Witte 
2 
outwards. The possibility of free movement allows for many different realisations and understandings 
of the self that may have been unavailable but for free movement. Freedom of movement, in other 
words, liberates not only the body but also the mind from the normative structures of the state.  
Free movement, as such, is to be defended normatively as it problematizes the domination that the 
nation state exerts over our choices, self-understanding and images of self-realisation. To put it as 
bluntly as possible, the nation state’s mode of social integration reduces the incredibly complex 
individual to a one-dimensional being: a national. We all have many meaningful relationships and ties 
of identification with different groups in society, based on our profession, sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
religion, residence, language group, hobbies, or sharing of certain social or cultural preferences (a 
football team, a mode of transport, a type of music, cuisine or mode of living). The nation state, 
however, essentially tells us that while those relationships and patterns of identification may matter to 
us privately, the only one that matters for us as public individuals is that of nationality. It is with 
nationals, after all, that we have to share our resources and that we have to discuss what is allowed or 
not in society. And it is the nation-state that can coerce us into (not) taking particular actions, that can 
criminalise certain behaviours, that can trivialise certain needs or that can prevent certain aspirations. 
As Amartya Sen explains, this “increasing tendency towards seeing people in terms of one dominant 
‘identity’ (…) is not only an imposition of an external and arbitrary priority, but also the denial of an 
important liberty of a person who can decide on their respective loyalties to different groups”.1 
The first reason why freedom of movement ought to be defended as the core of EU citizenship, 
then, is that it enhances our capacity to understand ourselves and realise ourselves in a more authentic 
and genuine fashion.  
Free movement as a recalibration of justice and democracy 
The second reason why free movement ought to be defended as the core of the relationship between 
the individual and the EU is because it makes us sensitive to practices of exclusion. The construction 
of EU citizenship, in particularly within the context of the rights to free movement and non-
discrimination, has the potential to lead to more inclusive ways of thinking about what freedom, 
justice, equality and participation should mean in the EU. It also has, however, the potential to lead to 
more practices of exclusion. The fact that EU citizenship and free movement are not embedded in a 
sufficiently sophisticated, responsive and democratic institutional structure makes it very difficult for 
the EU to mediate the social conflict that practices of inclusion and exclusion produce, and to 
legitimise the choices made.
2
  
There are many different ways to approach and address these issues. In very general terms, the 
right to free movement and non-discrimination attached to EU citizenship can be understood to correct 
instances of injustice and promote the inclusion of outsiders: it makes national distributive systems 
sensitive to the need to incorporate EU migrants who contribute to the host state in an economic and 
social way. The Court’s case law, and its criteria of ‘a certain degree of integration’ or ‘real link to the 
host state society’ can be understood as mechanisms that serve to identify which migrants should have 
a right to access redistributive practices in the host state on account of the fact that they meet the 
conditions of reciprocity the sustain those welfare benefits.  
I will not here discuss precisely how EU law attempts to balance the incorporation of outsiders in 
domestic practices of sharing with the need to sustain the reciprocal or solidaristic nature of those 
practices (which presume that access is bounded). The wider point that I am trying to make is that free 
movement makes us sensitive to the structural processes of exclusion that the nation state perpetuates, 
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and serves as an instrument to problematize these processes. Here, instead, I will touch very briefly on 
two of the most topical ways in which contemporary understandings of free movement and EU 
citizenship can be understood to produce instances of exclusion – which suggest that there is a need to 
defend free movement as the heart of EU citizenship.  
The first example is the ‘emergency brake’ that the UK has managed to secure in its renegotiation 
on the terms of its EU membership.
3
 This should eventually allow for the exclusion of EU migrant 
workers from in-work benefits for (at most) the first four years of their presence in the UK. In the UK, 
this has been presented as an exercise in justice: it ought to create more opportunities for nationals on 
the job market, and to prevent payments from the public purse to individuals who have not sufficiently 
contributed to that same public purse. This argument has been accepted by the heads of state of the 
other Member States and the Commission despite the absence of empirical corroboration. In fact, the 
most elaborate studies suggest that the fiscal effects of free movement on the UK are probably 
positive, and certainly neutral at worst.
4
 What we see here, then, is the problem if we understand 
freedom of movement as a luxury rather than an individual right at the heart of EU citizenship: it is 
prone to scapegoating and politicking, which are the exact forces that it is meant to combat. This is not 
to say that free movement cannot create pressures that produce exclusionary effects for national 
citizens (and which EU law ought to be sensitive to). It seems to me, however, first, that those 
pressures are primarily infrastructural (which cannot be scaled up sufficiently quick to accommodate 
access for all) and not of a financial nature, and second, that EU law’s understanding of the limits to 
free movement and non-discrimination offer sufficient guarantees to prevent such practices. The 
compatibility of the ‘emergency brake’ with the right of free movement is likely to be tested if the UK 
votes to remain in the EU, and we could place our fate in the Court to protect free movement and non-
discrimination as being at the heart of the relationship between the individual and the EU.  
Unfortunately, it appears that the Court itself is not convinced of this. The recent Dano case offers 
a good example of how the Court is increasingly turning its back on understanding free movement to 
be a right attached to the ‘fundamental status’ of every EU citizen. In that case, the Court suggested 
that the right to basic social assistance mechanisms (as a corollary of the right to equal treatment tied 
to residence in a host state) is unavailable for those citizens who do not have ‘sufficient resources’ to 
take care of themselves. In a ruling that comes quite close to depicting Ms. Dano in racist terms as a 
citizen whose presence in Germany is of no functional use to German society, the Court changes the 
category of EU citizens that can realistically make use of the promise of free movement. In simple 
terms, Dano suggests that free movement is not for all Europeans. It is not a right attached to the 
‘fundamental status of all EU citizens’, but rather a privilege that European playboys are allowed to 
make use of. Again, this judgment was celebrated throughout Europe as bringing about justice; as 
defending the welfare systems against the parasite that is the poor (or poorly-educated) fellow 
European. Instead, I would argue that it is about the perpetuation of exclusion of vulnerable citizens 
from the processes that serve to remedy those very vulnerabilities. It is a judgment that legally 
mandates the creation of a European underclass of vulnerable citizens who, because of their exercise 
of free movement, are neither politically represented nor materially protected from the most egregious 
forms of exclusion. This case shows why we need to defend free movement as a right at the core of 
EU citizenship: something that ought to be available under similar conditions for all nationals of the 
Member States, and not only for the privileged ones.  
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Free movement as separating ‘the nation’ from ‘the state’ 
The third and final reason why we ought to defend free movement at the core of EU citizenship is 
because of the latter’s idiosyncratic structure. Unlike national forms of citizenship, EU citizenship is 
not linked to a ‘community of fate’ that reflects certain ethno-cultural ideas of a homogenous 
community, forged on the basis of a shared language, history, myths and ethnicity, and solidified 
through boundary closure, narrowly-defined membership groups and exclusion of outsiders. EU 
citizenship, instead, is a ‘stateless’ or ‘anchorless’ idea of belonging and community: it suggests that 
its subjects are part of something that is incipient, ill-defined, and diverse. Often, this is understood as 
the main weakness or source of illegitimacy of EU citizenship. I would argue that it is exactly its 
strength.  
The absence of a link between the institutional idea of EU citizenship and a specified ‘ethnos’ or 
the idea of a ‘nation’ is exactly what makes EU citizenship normatively appealing. Accounts of the 
‘long history’ of European integration suggest that the inter-war experience and the Second World 
War identified the problems with parliamentary or national sovereignty. Very simply put: democracies 
premised on these ideals appeared not to be very good at remaining democratic. On this account, the 
creation of the EU was deliberately meant to constrain democratic externalities,
5
 and particularly the 
capacity of states to enforce practices of internal exclusion or external aggression. In other words, EU 
law serves to foreclose the capacity of domestic democratic actors to commit democratic suicide. 
Usefully, this narrative proved appealing for Member States that acceded to the EU in the aftermath of 
periods of totalitarianism. This project of depoliticisation was massively helped by the role of law in 
the integration process. The scholarship on ‘integration through law’ suggests that law is both the 
agent and object of integration, and is used to push through the objectives of integration even in the 
presence of political objection on the national or supranational level.  
What has all of this to do with free movement and EU citizenship, though? Free movement is at the 
core of the objective of constrained democracy. The legally enforceable right to enter and exit spaces 
of state authority and the legally enforceable right to equal consideration in whichever space an 
individual finds him or herself, go a long way towards limiting the power of the state to internally 
exclude certain groups or antagonise their neighbours. It is free movement, in a sense, which 
disciplines the nation state, and ensures that its civic institutional structure does not fall in the traps of 
the ethnos within which it historically grew. In that sense, our ‘anchorless’ EU citizenship is the 
perfect institutional container for a new – less ethnic – way of thinking about the role of the individual 
in the EU.
6
 And free movement is how this virtue is implemented. The third and final argument in 
defence of understanding free movement to be at the conceptual heart of EU citizenship, then, is that 
free movement is the perfect instrument for the implementation of the core normative promise of EU 
citizenship.  
Conclusion 
The Treaty suggests that EU citizenship is to be ‘additional to’ national citizenship. This contribution 
has argued that the added value that EU citizenship can offer primarily lies in its connection to 
freedom of movement. Freedom of movement, on this view, is an instrument that liberates the 
individual’s mind and body from the domination that the nation state exerts over it; that reorients 
domestic processes of justice and democracy towards more inclusive practices; and that 
institutionalises an idea of civic belonging on a continent that has been plagued for a century by the 
consequences of ethnic ideas of belonging. For these reasons, free movement must be celebrated and 
defended as the core of EU citizenship, as a right that is available for all 500 million EU citizens, and 
as an idea that benefits all those citizens – whether they make use of it or not.  
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